Power does strange things to the mind. It increases confidence that you are right. It also makes you less likely to be. It generates a sense of entitlement, which may mean you pay less attention to those with less power. This leads to failures of fairness.
This seems to be some part of what went wrong in recent scandals in the UK: Infected Blood, the Post Office, and at Grenfell Tower. I’ve written in depth about the first two. With yesterday’s publication of the report of the Inquiry into Grenfell, I’m reflecting on that and the wider lessons that those with power should learn, for fairness’s sake.
The horror of the fire at Grenfell Tower, where 72 people died after a series of failures and abuses, was bad enough in itself. But it sits within a much broader context. Ed Daffarn, one of the Grenfell Tower residents to survive the fire, has talked about it being the second act in a three act tragedy. I’d suggest that the other two acts (the ignoring of the views and concerns of residents prior the the fire, and their shocking treatment afterwards) were all about the effect of power, even limited power, and how it leads to errors.
The authorities’ response to Daffarn himself shows this in practice: as an articulate resident willing to express his views, prior to the fire and as the Tower was being refurbished, he was often the one who expressed concerns others were feeling. Rather than being seen as providing a channel for broader insights, the Tenant Management Organisation that ran the Tower on behalf of landlord, the London Borough of Kensington & Chelsea, clearly tended to regard him as a troublemaker. Remarkably, on his Grenfell Action Group blog, Daffarn specifically highlighted the risk of fire in the Tower six months before it occurred, in KCTMO – Playing with fire! (since withdrawn), and others. Daffarn would dearly love to have been proved wrong.
The final Inquiry Report is clear in its criticisms of the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO). These two quotations, the first on an insubstantial and insufficient review initiated to respond to a tenant petition setting out concerns about the refurbishment of the Tower, and the second part of the overall conclusions, will need to stand for the breadth of the damning findings:
“Given the history of the matter and the lack of trust between the residents of Grenfell Tower and the TMO, the board should have realised that only an independent review of the management of the project with particular reference to the residents’ complaints could fairly satisfy the requirements of the moment. As it was, the review was superficial and the group conducting it failed to carry out its investigation in a sufficiently thorough and robust manner. The report lacked balance.” (Para 33.63)
“The TMO lost sight of the fact that the residents were people who depended on it for a safe and decent home and the privacy and dignity that a home should provide. That dependence created an unequal relationship and a corresponding need for the TMO to ensure that, whatever the difficulties, the residents were treated with understanding and respect. We regret to say the TMO failed to recognise that need and therefore failed to take the steps necessary to ensure that it was met.” (Para 33.68)

This response by the Tenant Management Organisation and the Council – and the response by all of those with power in relation to the scandals mentioned – reflects long-standing literature about the poor decision-making and failures of judgement that come from power. In some senses, we shouldn’t be surprised when people in positions of power do act in ways that harm the interests of others, fail to listen to the less powerful, have a tendency to close ranks and deny prior errors. Those failures of fairness are built into power structures. Studies have for years told us that to be powerful is to be prone to overconfidence and error, particularly in interactions with others, and especially in interactions with the less powerful.
Power leads both to over-confidence and to errors. That is, psychological studies show that powerful people – even just those primed to feel powerful by artificial prompts – are more likely to be sure that they are right, and at the same time they are less likely to be correct. Many of those errors are around misreading social situations because powerful individuals have a tendency to imagine everyone should see things the same way as them, and don’t pay enough attention to others to learn that they are wrong.
Power leads us astray.
Power also reduces our inhibitions, so the powerful are more likely to take risks and transgress. The cold power that comes from money affects judgement too, in particular it seems to generate a sense of entitlement. Among the striking outcomes of a series of studies for a paper entitled, strikingly, Higher social class predicts increased unethical behaviour – it’s only slightly less striking when you realise that by social class the researchers intend socioeconomic standing rather than class, at least as that term is understood in the UK – are the tendencies of the wealthier to misbehave in terms of their driving styles. The drivers of more expensive cars are more likely to fail to stop for pedestrians crossing the road, and to cut off other vehicles, in both cases in breach of local traffic law. Those with higher socio-economic status are also more likely to nick sweets from children and to lie about the results of dice throws to their own small financial benefit, the study found.
Perhaps it is not surprising in the face of these sundry negative impacts of power, even of a limited form of power, that authorities in the scandals failed to respond to warning signs from those impacted, and tended to deny that anything had gone wrong or that they had a responsibility to try to put right what could be put right.
As Daffarn suggests, the response of the authorities after the fire was as poor as what came before, in many cases exacerbating the suffering of the survivors. One small example stands for the casual carelessness of those with power, and their failures of fairness:
“When official communications were eventually released, they were in English. That included communications sent to those who had been placed in hotels. People described feeling at a disadvantage because they could not read English well and had significant difficulty in gaining access to services, which they felt created unfairness…In some cases interpreters were provided, but not always in the right language.” (Para 100.60)
The council simply didn’t prepare well enough to carry out some of its key duties, the Report concludes:
“the wider evidence reveals a culture of neglect at RBKC over a number of years towards planning for humanitarian assistance. The existence of an effective plan for providing such assistance would probably have made a material difference to its response to the Grenfell Tower fire” (Para 101.73)
As Keltner, Gruenfeld and Anderson point out, there are many countervailing influences to the negative impacts of power: “many social values and practices, from conceptions of virtuous leaders to institutionalized checks and balances, have as their very purpose the placing of constraints on those with power”. For fairness to succeed, other players with power need to exert it in more positive ways, driving accountability and delivering those checks and balances.
As the evidence emerged in the Inquiry about the shocking misbehaviour of the insulation manufacturers Kingspan and Celotex, part of France’s Saint Gobain (whose illustrious history began with creating one of the greatest symbols of inequality, the mirrors for the Galerie des Glaces in the Palace of Versailles) in gaming fire safety regulations, I worked to encourage investors to seek to hold these businesses to account. Some did make some efforts, but the work had limited bite and ebbed quickly. There were a smattering of votes against individuals one year but these dissipated by the following year, even though the scandalous failures had not changed or been atoned for. That too was a failure of accountability and of fairness. US company Arconic, which supplied the cladding itself (material that sandwiched highly combustible hydrocarbons between thin sheets of aluminium), has escaped with even less holding to account by its shareholders.
The Report’s conclusions regarding each of these companies are as clear as they are damning. The fact that these blunt findings are highlighted in the executive summary itself shows how central the abuses of power by these businesses were to what went wrong:
“One very significant reason why Grenfell Tower came to be clad in combustible materials was systematic dishonesty on the part of those who made and sold the rainscreen cladding panels and insulation products.” (Para 2.19)
“From 2005 until after this Inquiry had begun, Kingspan knowingly created a false market in insulation for use on buildings over 18 metres in height by claiming that K15 had been part of a system successfully tested under BS 8414 and could therefore be used in the external wall of any building over 18 metres in height regardless of its design or other components. That was a false claim, as it well knew” (Para 2.32)
“In an attempt to break into the market for insulation suitable for use on high-rise buildings, created and then dominated by Kingspan K15, Celotex embarked on a dishonest scheme to mislead its customers and the wider market.” (Para 2.28)
“By late 2007 Arconic had become aware that there was serious concern in the construction industry about the safety of ACM panels and had itself recognised the danger they posed. By the summer of 2011 it was well aware that Reynobond 55 PE in cassette form performed much worse in a fire and was considerably more dangerous than in riveted form. Nonetheless, it was determined to exploit what it saw as weak regulatory regimes in certain countries (including the UK) to sell Reynobond 55 PE in cassette form, including for use on residential buildings.” (Para 2.23)
The lawyers representing victims at the Inquiry alleged that these appalling actions by the companies amounted to a fraud on the market, corruption with the most terrible consequences. The Grenfell United survivor campaign group is now calling for criminal charges. I’m not sure that power generally always corrupts, at least the power of those some far distances below the level of absolute power. But power, even of a limited sort, certainly does lead us astray, it does lead to misunderstandings and misreadings of situations. By its nature, it leads to a heedlessness of those with less power. Fairness requires those with power, even if they regard it as only a small degree of power, to lean hard against these natural tendencies. Fairness requires the powerful to temper their power and to listen harder to those who see themselves as without power. Fairness also requires others with different sources of power to exert it and hold them effectively to account. It requires all of us to consider the power that we have, and to keep asking how wisely we are using it.
The Report’s recommendations provide precise specifications of how these checks and balances and added protections should be put in place, but the lessons we need to learn are broader. Let us hope that these fairness lessons of Grenfell (and of the Post Office and Infected Blood scandals and, sadly, others) are learned.
See also: Fairness in the blood
The scandalous Post Office
Unfair trials: justice in the dock
Final – Phase 2 – Report of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry
Grenfell: Building a Disaster, BBC podcast, August 2024
The three-act tragedy quote from Ed Daffarn referenced here occurs at the start of the 10th episode, The Final Act, though the whole podcast series is highly recommended
Grenfell Tower Enquiry Podcast, BBC podcast, May 2018-November 2022
Grenfell: In the Words of Survivors, National Theatre production, July 2023
A stunning play using survivors’ words verbatim, highly recommended: recording available on National Theatre at Home
Power and overconfident decision-making, Nathanael Fast, Niro Sivanathan, Nicole Mayer, Adam Galinsky, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol 117, Issue 2, March 2012
Power, Approach and Inhibition, Dacher Keltner, Deborah Gruenfeld, Cameron Anderson, Psychological Review 2003, Vol 110 No 2
Higher social class predicts increased unethical behaviour, Paul Piff, Daniel Stancato, Stephane Cote, Rodolfo Mendoza-Duggan, Dacher Keltner, PNAS vol 109 no 11, March 2012
Note that while the title (and the article overall) references social class, this is actually a discussion of socio-economic standing
I am happy to confirm as ever that the Sense of Fairness blog remains a wholly personal endeavour.








