Introducing Fairness in Business and Investment

This is a version of my speech from the (very enjoyable) London launch event of my book, on October 29th 2026. A version, because as I spoke without notes so these aren’t the exact words that I actually said!

When I first worked in the City, I wasn’t actually working in the City. Before we moved to Portsoken Street, Hermes’ offices were just along from here, on the east side of Mansell Street, and the official bounds of the City ran straight down the middle of that street. It’s less stark now, but there are still streets in this area where you can see one one side of the street the steel, glass and concrete and the wealth of the City, and on this side the bricks and mortar and the poverty of Tower Hamlets, where we are now. I know of no better symbol of the unfairness of our world, and how it gets oddly fixed and ossified than that the arbitrary choices of the Romans in choosing the boundaries of their settlement 2000 years ago are still reflected in a divide between wealth and poverty today. And this place, and the organisation it hosts, Toynbee Hall, works with the poor of this poor borough, and they often use the language of fairness talk about themselves.

That’s why we’re here.

Why we are here, though, is of course this little book, Fairness in Business and Investment. We all feel unfairness viscerally, and it’s not just that we here are a self-selected bunch. Rather, fairness is core to the human condition, it’s been a foundation of our social success as a species, it has been shown to be hard-wired in our brains, and been demonstrated to be present in children of ages all the way down to 15 months. And the thesis of my book is that when we as business-people and investors fail to be fair, we are not just denying something core to our humanity, we are worse at business and investment. For being fair delivers better business and investment, and delivers more prosperity for the long-term.

The book is in 3 parts, introductory, then fairness in business and fairness in investment.

As part of the introduction, I look at how consistent fairness is across cultures around the world. The ultimatum game shows this. I give XX £20 that she must share as she chooses it with YY – and they will get to keep their chosen shares if YY accepts what she’s offered. Economists argue that XX should make a low offer, and YY accept any money that is offered, because it’s free money (at least for you!). But of course that’s not how it works. Almost everywhere in almost all conditions, the most frequent offer, the mode, is 50%; the mean is often a bit lower, but still usually in the low 40s%; and offers below around 20% or 25% are almost always rejected. Fairness is shown to be – almost – universal. There is a key exception to the fairness shown by the ultimatum game, which I’ll come back to later.

Also in the introductory section, I discuss fairness of process, including the crucial issue of the Rule of Law. And I discuss fairness of outcomes, including the question of meritocracy. We all so love fairness that we want to believe that we live in meritocracies, and we’re often willing to believe that those who are suffering somehow deserve their misfortune, even when we happen to know for sure that’s not really true, and even when we doubt the genuine existence of meritocracy. I was at an event a couple of weeks ago and someone asserted that ‘no one believes in meritocracy any more’, in the sense that no one believes that we do live in meritocracies any more. But sadly that’s not true. Exactly the wrong people believe in meritocracy: those who succeed tend to, they believe they merit their success, think it is based on their skill and hard work alone, and are willing to ignore advantages they had or the role of just plain luck. And if they fall into that myth of meritocracy trap, it turns them into the most awful people. They drive aggressively, cutting up other traffic. They cheat in tests. They literally steal sweets from children. Successful people really can be awful human beings in their personal lives; who knows how they might act in their working lives?

The core of the book is the section on fairness in business. Here I look at each of the main stakeholder relationships, as set out in s172 of the Companies Act – employees, customers, suppliers, communities and so on. For each of them I consider what fairness looks like in relation to that stakeholder, what the benefits of fairness are, and something about the current state of play (usually not as good as it could be). I use the s172 list because I think it’s a useful articulation, not because I want to be narrowly British in the analysis – in fact when I share that ‘enlightened shareholder value’ approach with directors as part of the training I do, directors from around the world recognise it as a clear articulation of their duties, what they think the job of boards is, and what they think companies are there to do. And I show that even in the supposedly narrowly shareholder-focused US, actually the law properly understood is much closer to that articulation of enlightened shareholder value.

Of the s172 stakeholders, there’s probably least evidence for fairness making a valuable difference in the case of the environment. I think that’s because that relationship isn’t mediated through humans, and so isn’t subject to the push and pull between people that is often the source of fairness. But even there I find evidence of the need to strike a fair balance. And I go all the way down the list of s172 stakeholders, including corporate governance and good business conduct, and fair dealing with shareholders. I cover dual class shares, and the accounting and reporting wonks among you will be particularly pleased to know that I cover true and fair, as well as fair, balanced and understandable and Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in that section. It’s striking how central fairness is to the language we use when we talk about the corporate relationship with its investors.

But it’s odd that we use fairness rather less in our expectations of investors themselves. So, to move to the final section of the book, fairness in investment. This section is rather less evidence-based and rather more aspirational than the fairness in business section. And the reason for this is that there is simply much less experience of fairness operating in the investment world, on which such evidence might be founded. Someone here’s employer has just launched an advertising campaign based on their being the fair pension and investment provider. While normally I love to see fairness in marketing, seeing it being applied as a core differentiator in the investment world depresses me a little.

And it’s here also that the outlier in the ultimatum game comes in: when researchers merely briefly called it a ‘Wall Street game’ when introducing the rules, the outcomes were very different, with initial offers much less generous and much greater acceptance of lowball offers. We fundamentally believe and accept that Wall Street, that the investment world, is less fair than the real world.

And that’s ironic because the foundation of all investment is the concept of fiduciary duties, that we’re looking after other people’s money and therefore must care for their interests above all. People in investment proudly talk about themselves as fiduciaries, as they should. And here’s the thing: fiduciary duties arise from that branch of the legal system known as Equity, which as the name suggests seeks to deliver fair outcomes whatever a strict interpretation of the law might be. So it is odd that investment, which is based on fiduciary duty, and so founded in equity, is not actually expected to be fair.

Fairness proves a valuable way to illuminate other key challenges in the investment world too, including stewardship, systemic risk and short-termism. The final nugget I’ll share is on short-termism, which we measure in investment using discount rates – the amount by which future money is worth less than money in the present. With the scale of our long-term problems, we desperately need to be thinking more long-term and so have lower discount rates, valuing the future more. But there’s a finding that in conditions of inequality – which obviously we are currently in – people have higher discount rates, they discount the future more and focus more on the present. There’s some logic to it, as inequality increases the risk that we may not be around to enjoy the future, and we may not have the funds to enjoy it. But the researchers argue that it’s more a psychological outcome than a logical one, and given that they’ve shown other psychological effects on discount rates (not least that men become much more short-term while in the presence of an attractive woman) it’s hard to argue with them.

So not only does unfairness exacerbate many of our future problems, it also constrains our ability – or at least how we perceive our ability – to deal with them.

So, in short, fairness matters to us as humans, deeply, viscerally. We miss something fundamental if we close our minds to it in our business and investment lives. Businesses need strong stakeholder relationships, all of which are stronger if mediated through fairness. Investment ignores fairness at its peril, risking the strength of customer (fiduciary) relationships, bringing systemic risks and limiting the ability to address them, getting timeframes wrong and too short-term, not least because of excess discounting. Yet we are human, and we shouldn’t allow the Wall Street game to have different fundamental rules to the rest of our lives, or be fooled by success within what we hope are meritocracies but really aren’t.

Fairness matters, and we will succeed more in business and for our investment clients, if we believe that and act more vigorously on it.

I’m happy to confirm as ever that the Sense of Fairness blog, and indeed Fairness in Business and Investment, are purely personal endeavours.

Fairness in Business and Investment, Paul Lee. Routledge, 2026

Fairness as competitive differentiator

This advertising campaign crossed my desk last week, and it has been worrying away at me since.

Delighted as I normally am to see fairness used in marketing, it troubles me that the good people at People’s Pension should have reached the conclusion that fairness in investment and pensions provision is a competitive differentiator. One would hope and expect that it was a basic expectation.

People’s Pension was a client in a former life and I regard a number of its staff as friends. I’m sure they know what they’re doing, and that the campaign is based on sound research. It’s just that every pension provider should be putting its members’ (beneficiaries’) interests first, fairly. That’s what fiduciary duty requires, even if fairness isn’t always what the investment world delivers.

I’m happy to confirm as ever that the Sense of Fairness blog is a purely personal endeavour.

Fairness piercing the veil, and filling gaps in the law

An extraordinary legal case was decided in the UK in April, and it has recently been determined that there can be no appeal from it. The court decision has led directly to the insolvency of a major property development group, and it illustrates the way in which fairness fills gaps in the law – indeed how fairness is a core element of how the law works.

The case is extraordinary because it deploys fairness effectively to overthrow a fundamental element of corporate law. The decision in effect enables the piercing of the corporate veil – the legal barrier that means the liabilities of a company stop at its doors and cannot be claimed from a parent, other group company, or shareholder. Limited liability, through this mechanism of the corporate veil, is generally regarded as a core element of capitalism, a protection of the shareholder providing capital, freeing them from the risk that they might lose more than their contribution to the company through their buying of shares. Because of this perceived centrality to the capitalist system, courts, and indeed legislators, are deeply wary of piercing the veil in the way this decision does.

However, there are certain policy aims that are so substantial that such effective veil piercing is seen as necessary. That is true of the policy underlying the law in the case in question, Crest Nicholson Regeneration v Ardmore Construction. It concerns Building Liability Orders, established under the Building Safety Act to ensure that appropriate contributions are made by those responsible for the remediation of buildings which since the terrible Grenfell Tower fire (see Power leads us astray: fairness lessons from Grenfell) are recognised as representing significant risks. Building Liability Orders (BLOs) allow the courts to extend the liability for remediation costs from the immediate company involved to associated companies where it is ‘just and equitable’ (what this blog would call fair) to do so.

Image from KCTMO – Feeling the Heat!, sadly prescient blog from Grenfell Action Group, March 14 2017

I deliberately say that this ‘in effect’ pierces the corporate veil, because it’s worth noting that there is some debate as to whether this is a full piercing, though to a non-specialist this may seem a debate on the head of a pin. As Christopher Veal of leading barristers’ chambers Pump Court explains: 

“Whether this constitutes “piercing the corporate veil” in the traditional sense is contested: some courts and commentators treat BLOs as a distinct statutory remedy rather than classic veil-piercing, on the basis that the court is not disregarding the corporate structure but rather applying a legislative override. Others characterise the practical effect as functionally equivalent to piercing the veil. The distinction matters less in practice than the statutory test itself, which turns on whether it is just and equitable to extend liability.”

Even though there is this debate, the case makes clear that sometimes statute and policy considerations will take decisions to extend liability notwithstanding the perceived strong constraint of the corporate veil. This step was seen as particularly needed in the development sector, where there is a history of each individual development being built by a thinly capitalised subsidiary so as to protect the parent, and wider group, from exposures to any potential liability. The immediate subsidiary involved in the development, Ardmore Construction Ltd, had been put into administration on the day before the initial adjudication against it (the judge decided to accept the suggestion that this was coincidence), and the court also found that there had been a corporate restructuring with some intent to limit broader liability. The ruling means that this restructuring has failed: following the court’s decision to pierce the veil, the whole Ardmore Construction Group entered administration in mid-June, and other related companies have sought protection from creditors.

This application of fairness to close gaps in the law isn’t as infrequent as people might imagine. In many ways, it is a core element of the functioning of the common law, under which judges reach decisions that are not explicitly covered by legislation, applying broader judgement and higher principles to do so. Fairness is often one of those higher principles. Think about the famous 1930s case of the snail in the bottle of ginger beer, Donoghue v Stevenson. There would have been no need for the case to reach the House of Lords (then the UK’s highest court) if the drinker of the ginger beer in question had been its purchaser rather than her friend for whom she bought it. If the buyer had drunk it and suffered the consequences, contract law protections would have applied. In the absence of some form of contractual protection for the drinker, the House of Lords applied a more general duty of care to manufacturers and found that the Stevenson business could be seen to have negligently breached that duty of care. From this finding based in fairness has arisen the whole modern concept of the law of tort, whereby in certain constrained circumstances duties of care arise outside of contractual relationships.

In other situations, courts will imply fairness into contracts that on the face of it do not expect it. In her interesting book Fool Proof, law professor Tess Wilkinson-Ryan discusses the Massachusetts Supreme Court case Fortune v National Cash Register. Orville Fortune was employed at will and at a low salary, with his main pay opportunity through commission on sales – a portion paid at the point of sale and the rest on delivery and installation of the equipment. Fortune was sacked between landing a big sale and the point at which he would have received the second part of his commission from that sale. While on the face of the contract his employer could indeed do this, the courts implied a duty of good faith such that National Cash Regiester was not in fact permitted to exploit its worker in this way. Instead, it needed to treat Fortune fairly and allow him to take the fair benefit of the commission he had earned through his sale. The court stated bluntly: 

“we are merely recognizing the general requirement in this Commonwealth that parties to contracts and commercial transactions must act in good faith toward one another. Good faith and fair dealing between parties are pervasive requirements in our law; it can be said fairly, that parties to contracts or commercial transactions are bound by this standard.”

Further, there is a whole section of the English legal system fully animated by fairness. It is not by chance that this is called ‘equity’, now formally combined with the rest of the legal system but with its origins in a mediaeval court system focused on delivering fairness. As Alastair Hudson states in the opening words of the seventh edition of his Understanding Equity & Trusts: “Equity is a means by which English law ensures fair outcomes in individual cases where the strict application of the common law or statute would otherwise generate injustice.” In practice, the concept of equity applies somewhat more narrowly than this assertion implies, but the intent is to identify the fair outcome when there is a lack of clarity in the common law or in statute. Equity lies at the heart of trust law, and so as I explore in my forthcoming book, the sense of fairness animates the fiduciary duties with which trustees are vested. 

Hudson develops the thought further in his Great Debates in Equity and Trusts, recognising the need for the equity approach to soften the edge cases of common law and statute, so as to ensure that the legal system overall is “rounded”. He argues: “Clearly, there need to be rules … However, there will also be situations in which the ‘letter of the law’ will not necessarily produce an ideal response, or worse, a positively unfair response. There will be situations in which people need some flexibility in which to create new models which will work better for them personally or better in unanticipated situations. One future for the UK economy is likely to be in the creative field and in the new frontiers of technology. By definition, an innovative economy may need innovative legal models … to maximise its success. Therefore, non-rigid ways of thinking will be important.”

He concludes: “a legal system needs a synthesis of strict rules (of the sort typified by statute and by common law) and mechanisms for achieving fair outcomes when the strict rules will not achieve that”.

The extent to which fairness will require further substantive upendings of traditional legal understandings such as the Crest Nicholson Regeneration v Ardmore Construction piercing of the corporate veil remains to be seen. But it seems clear that fairness will continue to be needed to fill gaps in, and round off the edges of, the common law and legislation.

See also: Power leads us astray: fairness lessons from Grenfell
The limited responsibility company, or the tale of the unnatural revolutionary

I am happy to confirm as ever that the Sense of Fairness blog is a purely personal endeavour.

Crest Nicholson Regeneration v Ardmore Construction [2026] EWHC 789

Crest Nicholson v Ardmore [2026] EWHC 789 (TCC): A Landmark Decision on Building Liability Orders, Christopher Veal. Pump Court Chambers, 22 May 2026

Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562

Fool Proof: How Fear of Playing the Sucker Shapes our Selves and the Social Order – and what we can do about it, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan. Harper Collins, 2023

Fortune v National Cash Register Co, 373 Mass 96 (1977)

Understanding Equity & Trusts, Alastair Hudson. Routledge, Seventh Edition 2022

Great Debates in Equity and Trusts, Alastair Hudson. Macmillan, 2014